PONTA’S AND OPREA’S LAWYER – A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Loredana Radu, lawyer of former Prime Minister Victor Ponta and former Vice Prime Minister Gabriel Oprea, attends to an interest group including politicians, magistrates and military officers. Attorney Radu defends the head of the military spies, Gen. Marian Hăpău, without holding a permit of access to classified information. The document is necessary in her client’s case and attorney Radu used to visit him even at the Command Center. The disclosures belong to Col. (res.) Doru Paraschiv who filed a criminal complaint against Gen. Hăpău for repeated threats. Paraschiv is an old structure chief of the Defense General Department of Information (DGIA), forced to be discharged on the back door of the Ministry for National Defense. He was accused of “facilitating information leaks”, without researching or proving the accusation. Former  DGIA officer states that he was eliminated due to his denial to join the business and games of the ”Oprea-Hăpău group”.

Why did you file a criminal complaint against your superior officer at the Defense General Department of Information (DGIA), Gen. Marian Hăpău?

He disliked me because I would not play into the hand of his interest group. I had always been teased by Gen. Hăpău who officially declared that he had nothing against me. Yet on 28 June 2013 he stopped me on an alley of the Bucharest Military Hospital, therefore a facility of the Ministry for National Defense, and threatened me with throwing me out of the army.  He called me a traitor because I hang out with some prosecutor. Subsequently he discharged me “on the sly”. I decided to challenge in court both my removal from the army, as well as to call to account for Gen. Hăpău’s threats.

Did you run into Loredana Radu in court, attorney of former Prime Minister Ponta and Vice Prime Minister Oprea? How did she end up the lawyer of the DGIA chief?

I know her from the criminal law suits I have with Hăpău Marian whom she represents as an attorney. I have known for a long time that she is a part of the Oprea-Hăpău group because I hold the information and the possibility to prove it. Mrs. Radu has a Mafioso style of handling things. Looking down on me, she always tried to influence and discourage me. Between hearings, she told me to mind my own business and to stop all these complaints to prosecutors and judges because they are pointless.

In the written conclusions filed by attorney Loredana Radu for Paraschiv vs.Hăpău case one can notice above the header the decision set by military magistrate Cezarian Buga, the person who took over the file without a random allocation

Have you met former superior officer Hăpău, during trials?

Not at all. I often asked why defendant Hăpău never appeared for hearings. Attorney Radu would answer that she had just come from his office at the Command Conter of the Defense General Department of Information. Therefore Loredana Radu entered  a zero-security unit, the highest level in a military facility. She arranged the trial details with her client there. Seriously, so they could only meet on the day of the trial, in the DGIA chief’s office?

And what is the problem, they were not allowed?

Gen. Hăpău had to order a security check for this lawyer. We know that Loredana Radu was awarded her advanced practice certification and doctoral degree from the military training area. She has a doctoral thesis from which I do not think she can utter the first sentence. There are issues not related to her profession, not even as a hobby. I am leaving this matter aside. Yet what level of ORNISS (National Registry Office for Classified Information) access did Mrs. Radu hold in order to represent people from the national security area? There is classified information that a client working in the intelligence department can mention. An attorney with the possibility of accessing top secret or high confidentiality levels must have an ORNISS certificate. Mrs. Radu does not possess such a document in the file. Sometimes, at certain hearings related to my cases, Loredana Radu was replaced by other attorneys who surely did not possess ORNISS certificates. My attorney was forced to acquire a permit for work confidentiality from the Bar. As for the situation of state classified information, he recommended another attorney with an ORNISS certificate. There are only a few lawyers holding such a certificate in Romania.

How do you know that attorney Radu had access to classified information?

Let’s look at the conclusions she filed for the case 493/1/2014. In this document, Loredana Radu says that, ”through his actions, the petitioner made possible leaks of classified information to unauthorized individuals”. This proves that she, as Gen, Hăpău’s attorney, was aware of classified information. This document bears the direct decision of military judge Cezarian Buga, dated 01 October 2014.  Well, in an institution such as the Military Court of Appeal, the person deciding the correspondence is the President, and not a simple judge! This stands as a proof that the head of the Court back then, judge Gheorghe Manea, was only a background performer. Magistrate Buga arrogated leadership because he was a part of the Oprea-Hăpău group. Worse than that, it turns out that Buga waited for and intercepted the file for Gen. Hăpău (details here). Judge Buga should wonder if he was worth another general star, awarded illegally by the President of Romania, through disinformation at the highest level! Justice will reach him too.

Attorney Radu refers to the leaks of classified information

A conflict within an intelligence service is a serious matter. Have you ever tried to clear things out with Gen.Hăpău?

Military prosecutor Lupulescu Nicolae investigating y case advised me to reconcile with Hăpău. Lupulescu worked at the military department of the Prosecutor’s Office with the High Court of Cassation and Justice (now transferred to the Ministry for National Defense, editor’s note). The prosecutor was telling me that there was nothing he could do for me because I was fighting a very powerful person. My workmates informed me that Lupulescu used to call me at his office, as normal, but he was going to Hăpău’s office. Hăpău’s statements, at the current DGIA chief, are written in a calligraphic handwriting. It is not the handwriting under the pressure of an investigation. It does not look like his terrible handwriting from the decisions that I know. In his decision, Lupulescu says that after hearing Gen. Hăpău, he told him that ”I facilitated the leaks” of classified information to unauthorized persons. A prosecutor, especially a military one, if learning from the military intelligence chief about infringements of national security, he must investigate and clarify the matter immediately. Lupulescu had to ask Gen. Hăpău to deliver all evidence, but he did not do it. This prosecutor does not know the sanctions and crimes related to national security. The law does not include the term of ”facilitating information leaks”. There is only the concept of  ”disclosing” information to unauthorized persons which is an infringement. I have not received any fines, my file does not include any person benefiting from the so-called leaks. In my case, “a security incident” was made up, therefore nothing official. A setup to remove me from the army. No investigation took place, I have not given any explanatory note, no actions for fixing the “leak” were taken, no publishing in the Army Informative Bulletin, SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service) and the Supreme Council for State Defense were not informed. I found myself on 26 July 2013 in the situation where ORNISS withdrew my SSID (top secret highly confidential security certificate, editor’s note.), due to the DGIA chief, Gen. Hăpău. Without any reason, as stated by the law, the Minister of Defense then, Mircea Dușa, had no idea what was going on. He found it out six months later, from me, even though procedures required that he should be informed within 30 minutes from the occurrence. I found myself discharged, without employment termination, without handing over my card, without the action being recorded where it should, i.e. in the human resources register. They fired me because I was in the way of the criminal group Oprea-Hăpău. Because I did not agree to perform counter-informative security at the assemblies of  Oprea’s and his allies’ party. Because “playing” certain people with specific methods (details here) was not appealing to me.

After his questionable discharge, Col.Paraschiv still had his military spy ID

Who did you have to ”play”?

According to the law, I can state the following: I developed a case, infiltrated, founded serious issues, and my superior officer informed me the next day that I had to hand over everything. He would take my case or transfer me. I was being transferred every year from 2008 till 2013. Another example: when developing a specific activity, I had to perform a certain action, at a certain time, but the approvals would arrive too late. So I was losing the operational moment. And I was hunting spies, real cases. Despite these obstacles, we, as professionals, did not wait, and so did our mates from DGIPI (General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection), SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service), SIE (Foreign Intelligence Service). We had an amount of information related to an issue, and when the embargo over that issue would cease, information appeared. But with these rushed actions, Gen. Hăpău hijacked our profession and supported the Mafia with our means. He was at Oprea’s disposal, who had a close relationship with Hăpău. Both had the image of indestructible people, whatever the changes. Of course, since they stopped catching spies or anything related to national security, they did all kinds of things: cases of blackmailing the right people, total surveillance of people/actions/events, erasing tracks, assuming all sorts of goods or assets, especially in the operational area. They did not end up chiefs by accident, we do not have problems with army acquisitions by accident. They had the power to check and decide about suppliers. If many years ago my legal findings had been investigated and the law enforced, surely no people would be dead due to this criminal group and  national security would not have been at risk!

There were national security threats, such as  Ciorogârla case, with the stolen weapons from a military storehouse. What was Gen. Hăpău doing during that time?

We have two issues in the army that ridiculed us in the intelligence world: Ciorogârla and Floricel Achim (non-commissioned officer accused of espionage, editor’s note). Hăpău had to be held responsible in both cases. Some security checks in Oprea’s interest took place and what was necessary for the army stopped being done. Floricel had connections with a Bulgarian citizen. His case was not properly founded. The person in charge, as one of Hăpău’s subordinate, only mimicked the investigation and the report came out fine. Floricel was considered a ”good boy”, he was good at computers and everybody was using him. That is how he ended up in a military unit where important information circulated. And the chiefs of SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service) and DNA (Anti-Corruption National Department) arrived, there was a big riot. They walked inside the unit and, with the general in command, they searched everybody, hands on the walls, looking for the information robbery, through their pockets and their computers. If Hăpău, head of office at that time and his subordinate were doing their jobs, it would not have turned out like this. Hăpău was a service chief at the Counter-Information Direction and he was responsible for Ciorogârla (the weapon storehouse, editor’s note), but his interest group protected him. When Ciorogârla happened, the counter-information chief was Gen. Ungureanu Ion. He was fired and transferred to a lower position, and the person who failed to do his job, i.e. Hăpău, became head of DGIA. Interesting, isn’t it?

After the weapon robbery from a military unit in Ciorogârla, Gen. Marian Hăpău left the Counterespionage Department, but he was promoted four years later as head of DGIA

Have you tried to inform your superior officers about these serious misconducts? 

I took my stand within the institution. I thought of going to report it to the Minister. After they withdrew my access to classified information, I performed my activity in isolation, upon availability. I was sitting in an office under the supervision of 2-3 people. One of them had the responsibility to inform immediately a certain superior officer if I disappeared for more than seven minutes. A female workmate even told me she would come with me to the toilet if necessary.

Colonel Paraschiv says that after being removed from DGIA and a year after his eviction, he was the victim of a secret document setup. Authorities were informed that among the bags containing Paraschiv’s luggage (like the one in the photo), the one with number 47 contained classified information. The bag number 47 was removed and taken to an unknown direction. Nobody knows who owns this “evidence” now and if the bag did contain what the denunciation claimed.